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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS SUPPORTED IN MAJOR

FOREIGN POLICY DISPUTE-DresserIndustries, Inc. v. Baldrige,
549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
Plaintiff Dresser Industries, Inc. and its French subsidiary
sought to enjoin the United States Commerce Department from
imposing sanctions on the French subsidiary for exporting gas
pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union in violation of Commerce
Department regulations. Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the imposition of Commerce Department sanctions revoking the subsidiary's export rights previously
had been denied. In response, plaintiffs requested an immediate
oral hearing pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 388.19(b) (1982) seeking an
order from the agency to lift the sanctions imposed by the denial
order. Because the Hearing Commissioner failed to take immediate action, plaintiffs argued that they had been denied administrative procedural due process and the district court should intervene to stay the sanctions. Although the district court found that
all of plaintiffs' administrative remedies had not been exhausted
and that plaintiffs made no showing of irreparable harm, it acknowledged that the agency must act expeditiously and issued an
order requiring that the agency promptly respond to plaintiffs'
motion pending before the Hearing Commissioner. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for extraordinary injunctive relief after
considering United States foreign policy prohibiting the export of
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gas pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union to protest the imposition of martial law in Poland. Significance-This decision establishes that courts will protect and promote a party's procedural
rights in the administrative process even though requests for extraordinary judicial relief must be denied because their implementation would compromise United States foreign policy.
II.

ALIENS' RIGHTS

PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ATTEMPTING TO RE-ENTER THE
UNITED STATES Is ENTITLED TO DuE PROCESS IN AN EXCLUSIONARY

HEARING--Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
Respondent, a permanent resident alien, sought habeas corpus
relief from an order to exclude and deport her which was issued
after an exclusionary hearing by an immigration law judge of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Respondent was
apprehended following a brief visit to Mexico as she attempted to
smuggle six nonresident aliens across the United States-Mexican
border. The INS charged her with violating section 212(a)(31) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(31), which provides for the exclusion of any alien seeking
admission who "knowingly and for gain" assists any other alien in
entering or attempting to enter the United States illegally. Respondent argued to the district court that before she could be
barred from the United States, a deportation hearing, not an exclusionary hearing, was required. She asserted that only persons
"entering" the United States are subject to exclusionary proceedings and as a permanent resident alien briefly visiting a foreign
country she could not "enter" the United States upon her return.
She concluded, therefore, the substantively and procedurally
favorable deportation hearing was required because it was the
only alternative proceeding. The district court vacated the exclusion and deportation order and instructed the INS that it could
proceed against the respondent only in a deportation proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that the INS had statutory authority to decide questions of entry and exclusion in an exclusionary hearing. The Court reasoned first, that the legislative history
and language of the Act indicated a strong congressional intent
that questions concerning the admissibility of entering aliens, including permanent resident aliens be determined in an exclusionary hearing and second, that the INS has the authority to deter-
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mine if an alien has "entered" the United States as required by
the Act. The Court remanded the case so the court of appeals
could determine if the exclusionary hearing accorded the respondent the due process required by the interest balancing test articulated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Significance-In this decision the Court extended due process rights to
permanent resident aliens in exclusionary hearings and refused to
require deportation hearings to exclude permanent resident aliens
returning to the United States following brief visits abroad.
ALIEN DOES NOT HAVE A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT INTEREST IN A
PROCEDURE TO STAY DEPORTATION WHERE THE INS ESTABLISHED
THE PROCEDURE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE-Wong Chung

Wen v. Ferro, 543 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
An alien under warrant of deportation sought a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
(INS) unexplained denial of "deferred action status," which is
available according to the INS Operating Instruction (01)
103.1(a)(1)(ii). The 01 provides that "[t]he district director, may,
in his discretion, recommend consideration of deferred action, an
act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority, and
in no way an entitlement, in appropriate cases." The district
court affirmed that an illegal alien is entitled to the protection of
the fourteenth amendment, but held that 01 103.1(a)(1) (ii), which
implements an informal administrative procedure for convenience
of the INS, confers no substantive benefit. The court specifically
rejected Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979), in which
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 01 103.1(a)(1)(ii)
was based on humanitarian considerations and thus conferred a
substantive interest entitled to due process and equal protection.
Under Nicholas the INS had to justify its refusal to confer deferred action status when an alien had established prima facie
compliance with the OI's guidelines. The court rejected Nicholas
for two reasons. First, the INS amended 10 103.1(a)(1)(ii) to
clarify the agency's original intention to utilize the 01 solely for
the administrative convenience of the Service. The 01 originally
required that the district director recommend deferred action if
the deportation of an alien "would be unconscionable because of
... The amended 01 now
. . . appealing humanitarian factors.
provides that the director "may, in his discretion, recommend
consideration of deferred action" and expressly denies that deferred action is an entitlement. Second, the court relied on the
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reasoning in Zacharakis v. Howerton, 517 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.
Fla. 1981), and held that judicial recognition of substantive benefits in intra-agency administrative guidelines would create rights
that Congress did not intend to confer. Significance-This decision clearly establishes that the amended 01 103.1(a)(1)(ii) is a
purely discretionary proceeding of the INS and that it confers
upon aliens no substantive right to deferred action status.
III. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A PLAINTIFF SUING A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN'S INSURER IS NOT ENTI-

TLED TO A TRIAL BY JuRY-Goar v. Compania Peruana de

Vapores, 688 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff sued a government-owned Peruvian corporation and
its insurer claiming damages for injuries sustained when a negligently operated vessel, wholly owned by the Peruvian government, struck a dock. Plaintiff argued that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) entitled him to bring his
claim before a jury. The district court, however, held that 28
U.S.C. § 1330, which establishes jurisdiction only for nonjury civil
actions against foreign states, governs all cases in which foreign
states, including agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states,
are defendants. The court also held that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a) the plaintiff's direct action against the Peruvian corporation's insurer was an action against the sovereign. The court reasoned that permitting diversity jurisdiction and a jury trial would
contravene the legislature's intent in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to promote uniformity of treatment. The court then
considered whether the seventh amendment right to a jury trial
"in suits at common law" applied to guarantee a jury trial in this
case. Unable to find any historical precedent supporting jury trials in cases involving a foreign sovereign as defendant, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had no constitutional right to a jury
trial. Significance-This decision establishes that 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a), which precludes jury trials, applies not only to suits
against foreign sovereigns, but also to direct actions against insurers of foreign sovereigns.

